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Daniels, Davidson and the Unlearned Lesson of Parratt v.
Taylor: Eliminating Simple Negligence as a Basis for
Procedural Due Process Claims (If at First You
Don't Succeed, Overrule It)
No problem so perplexes the federal courts today as determining
the outer bounds of section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42
U.S.C. § 1983, the ubiquitous tort remedy for deprivations of rights
secured by federal law (primarily the Fourteenth Amendment) by per-
sons acting under color of state law.'
Thus Judge Posner, writing for the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit, related the continuing confusion facing courts
two years after the Supreme Court, in Parratt v. Taylor,2 "put [its] shoul-
der to the wheel hoping to be of greater assistance" 3 to federal courts
litigating section 19834 claims based on ordinary negligence. In Parratt,
the Supreme Court held that negligent action of a state official, acting
under color of state law, could deprive an individual of property. How-
ever, a negligent deprivation would only support a section 1983 claim
where the loss was suffered without due process of law. The Court
stressed that the availability of a postdeprivation remedy, which might
enable the injured party to redress his claims, might satisfy the due pro-
cess requirement. 5
Judge Posner was not alone in his confusion. The judicial and aca-
demic reaction to the Court's attempt in Parratt to clarify the law demon-
strates that the decision only complicated the law, leaving many issues
unresolved and raising new questions. 6 It remained true, as it was before
Parratt, that:
[T]he question of whether an allegation of simple negligence is suffi-
cient to state a cause of action under § 1983 is more elusive than it
appears at first blush. It may well not be susceptible of a uniform an-
swer across the entire spectrum of conceivable constitutional viola-
tions which might be the subject of a § 1983 action.7
The Court has acknowledged this confusion in its subsequent con-
1 Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1201 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1049
(1984).
2 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
3 Id. at 533-34. See also infra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
4 The relevant portion of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
5 451 U.S. at 536-37, 543-44.
6 See infra notes 19-35 and accompanying text.
7 Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 139-40 (1979).
NOTES
sideration of section 1983 claims based on simple negligence. In yet an-
other attempt to provide some guidance to the lower federal courts, the
Supreme Court partially overruled Parratt, holding that the "Due Process
Clause [of the fourteenth amendment] is simply not implicated by a neg-
ligent act of [a state] official causing unintended loss of or injury to life,
liberty or property."8 Unfortunately, the new holding leaves many of the
same questions unresolved.9
This note will examine the decisions in Daniels v. Williams 0 and Da-
vidson v. Cannon,I' the companion cases which partially overrule Parratt v.
Taylor. Part I sketches the already well-documented judicial confusion
and academic controversy that occurred before and after Parratt. Part II
sets out the facts of Daniels and Davidson, and examines the reasoning of
the lower federal courts and the Supreme Court. Part III asserts that the
sharper focus and explicit language of Daniels and Davidson evidence the
Court's attempt to present a precise holding and clarify the issues mud-
died by Parratt. Part IV will show that, in spite of this attempt, the Court
has again failed to provide the guidance needed in this controversial area
of constitutional law.
I. Parratt: The Confusion Before and After
Before the Supreme Court decided Parratt v. Taylor in 1981, no legal
consensus existed setting forth the level of tortious conduct required to
establish a due process violation under section 1983.12 Indeed, the
Court noted in Parratt, that the "diversity in approaches is legion."'
3
The Court granted certiorari on two occasions prior to Parratt to decide
the issue, but in each instance disposed of the case on different grounds.
In Procunier v. Navarette,'4 the Court held that the defendants' qualified
8 Daniels v. Williams, 106 S. Ct. 662, 663 (1986).
9 See infra notes 109-120 and accompanying text.
10 106 S. Ct. 662 (1986).
11 106 S. Ct. 668 (1986).
12 Justice White, in his dissent to denial of certiorari in Jackson v. City ofJoliet, 465 U.S. 1049
(1984), cited the following cases to illustrate the inconsistent approaches taken by the circuit courts
dealing with § 1983 actions brought by plaintiffs injured because of state officials' negligence: Clark
v. Taylor, 710 F.2d 4 (1st Cir. 1983); Morrison v. Washington County, 700 F.2d 678 (1 1th Cir.), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 864 (1983); Hull V. City of Duncanville, 678 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1982); Hirst v.
Gertzen, 676 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1982); Doe v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 649 F.2d 134
(2d Cir.), after remand, 709 F.2d 782 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied sub nom., Catholic Home Bureau v.
Doe, 464 U.S. 864 (1983). See also infra note 13 and accompanying text.
13 451 U.S. at 533 (citing Williams v. Kelly, 624 F.2d 695 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S.
1019 (1981); Beard v. Mitchell, 604 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1979); Fulton Mkt. Cold Storage Co. v. Cul-
lerton, 582 F.2d 1071 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1121 (1979); O'Grady v. Montpelier, 573
F.2d 747 (2d Cir. 1978); Hampton v. Holmesburg Prison Officials, 546 F.2d 1077 (3d Cir. 1976);
Jones v. Marshall, 528 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1975); Diamond v. Thompson, 523 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir.
1975); Kimbrough v. O'Neil, 523 F.2d 1057 (7th Cir. 1975); Carter v. Estelle, 519 F.2d 1136 (5th
Cir. 1975); Pitts v. Griffin, 518 F.2d 72 (8th Cir. 1975); Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir.
1975), modified en banc, 545 F.2d 565 (1976), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 932 (1978); Russell v. Bodner, 489
F.2d 280 (3d Cir. 1973);Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973);
McCray v. Maryland, 456 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1972); Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358 (D.C. Cir. 1971),
rev'd, District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973); Madison v. Manter, 441 F.2d 537 (1st Cir.
1971); Howard v. Swenson, 426 F.2d 277 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 948 (1970); Whirl v. Kern,
407 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 901 (1969); Striker v. Pancher, 317 F.2d 780 (6th
Cir. 1963)).
14 434 U.S. 555 (1978).
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immunity prevented recovery, regardless of whether the allegation of
negligence would have supported a claim for relief.15 In Baker v. McCol-
lan, 16 the Court did not reach the issue of simple negligence as the basis
for section 1983 liability because the plaintiff had failed to meet the
threshold jurisdictional requirement. The Court noted that the plaintiff
had not shown deprivation of a right "secured by the Constitution and
laws" of the United States.
17
The Court granted certiorari in Parratt, recognizing that its earlier
decisions in Procunier and Baker had not "aided the various Courts of Ap-
peals and District Courts in their struggle to determine the correct man-
ner in which to analyze claims"' 8 for the negligent deprivation of
constitutional rights. The Court apparently intended Parratt to resolve
the controversy.1 9
In Parratt, Bert Taylor, an inmate in a state prison, brought suit in
federal district court under 42 U.S.C. section 1983. He argued that the
prison official's negligent loss of the hobby kit he had ordered consti-
tuted a deprivation of property without due process of law, and thus vio-
lated the fourteenth amendment. The Court concluded that Taylor's
complaint satisfied the prerequisites of a due process claim: The defend-
ants had acted under color of state law, the hobby kit was considered
"property," and "the alleged loss, even though negligently caused, amounted to
a deprivation."20 The Court held, however, that the fourteenth amend-
ment protects only against those deprivations which occur "without due
process of law."' 21 Because the state's postdeprivation tort remedy would
have satisfied procedural due process requirements, the Court found no
violation of section 1983.22 Thus, Parratt stands for two propositions:
(1) the negligent act of a state official can result in a deprivation (at least
of property) within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment; and (2) in
the event of a deprivation, an adequate postdeprivation remedy can sat-
isfy the procedural due process requirement of the fourteenth
amendment.
15 Id. at 562-63, 566 n.14. ChiefJustice Burger dissented because the majority failed to address
the very question upon which certiorari had been granted: "Whether negligent failure to mail certain
of a prisoner's outgoing letters states a cause of action under Section 1983?" Id. at 567 (Burger,
C.J., dissenting). Burger, contrary to the majority opinion with which he agreed in Parratt, asserted
that such a negligent deprivation was not actionable. Id.
16 443 U.S. 137 (1979).
17 Id. at 140.
18 Parratt, 451 U.S. at 533.
19 Academic commentators also noted the controversy: "[T]he issue of the proper basis of Sec-
tion 1983 liability-ranging from intent on the one hand to strict liability on the other-has perco-
lated in the federal courts for years. Specifically, the question of whether negligence is actionable
under Section 1983 has caused much confusion." Nahmod, ConstitutionalAccountability in Section 1983
Litigation, 68 IowA L. REV. 1, 3 (1983).
20 451 U.S. at 536 (emphasis added). It is the italicized clause which was overruled in Daniels.
106 S. Ct. at 663.
21 Id. at 537 (citing Baker, 443 U.S. at 145).
22 451 U.S. at 544.
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Unfortunately, the Parratt decision resolved little.23 It generat-
edmore controversy and criticism than it did praise. 24 Commentators ac-
cused the Court of unfairly attempting to narrow the federal docket by
eliminating plaintiffs with potential state tort claims. 25 Several commen-
tators also criticized the Parratt decision for its ambiguity.
26
Lower courts continued to split in determining what level of negli-
gence would support a section 1983 claim.27 Courts also differed in de-
termining whether the Parratt doctrine of "postdeprivation remedies" 28
applied to the negligent deprivation of life and liberty, as well as prop-
erty interests. 29 Parratt concerned only the negligent deprivation of
property (Bert Taylor's hobby kit). Some courts, however, expanded
Parratt to support holdings that an adequate postdeprivation remedy
would satisfy procedural due process in the event of a negligent depriva-
tion of life or liberty, as well as property.
30
The Court made several initial attempts to clarify some of the ques-
tions which arose in response to Parratt. In Logan v. Zimmerman Brush
Company,31 the Court stated that the Parratt doctrine, which held that a
postdeprivation remedy can satisfy due process, should not extend to
negligent deprivations suffered because of established state procedure.3 2
The Court further clarified Parratt in Hudson v. Palmer,3 3 where it held
that the postdeprivation remedy doctrine would apply to intentional, as
well as negligent deprivations. 34 Even these later modifications, how-
ever, failed to provide lower federal courts with the guidance needed to
determine when tortious conduct rises to the level of a constitutional vio-
23 "The Court obviously hoped to resolve some of the previous confusion about the connection
between negligence and Section 1983 by its discussion in Parratt. Unfortunately, it did not do so,
except at a superficial level." Nahmod, supra note 19, at 4.
24 See, e.g., Eaton and Wells, Substantive Due Process and the Scope of Constitutional Torts, 18 GA. L.
REv. 201, 203 nn.8-9 (1984) ("Parratt has been both hailed and condemned.").
25 See, e.g., Kirby, Demoting 14th Amendment Claims to State Torts, 68 A.B.A. J. 166, 167 (1982)
(describing Parratt and the "dramatic narrowing of the sort of'state action' that will trigger the 14th
Amendment"). See also Shapiro, Keeping Civil Rights Actions Against State Officials in Federal Court: Avoid-
ing the Reach of Parratt v. Taylor and Hudson v. Palmer, 3 J. L. & INEq.UALrry 161 (1985).
26 See Nahmod, supra note 19, at 4; Note, Due Process and Section 1983: Limiting Parratt v. Taylor to
Negligent Conduct, 71 CALMF. L. REV. 253, 257 (1983) ("Extracting a precise holding from the various
opinions is difficult."); Note, Basis of Liability in a Section 1983 Suit: When is the State-of-Mind Analysis
Relevant?, 57 IND. LJ. 459, 460 (1982) ("The Court ambiguously acknowledged that negligence may
be actionable under Section 1983.").
27 See, e.g., Davidson v. O'Lone, 752 F.2d 817 (3d Cir. 1984); Daniels v. Williams, 748 F.2d 229
(4th Cir. 1984); Begg v. Moffitt, 555 F. Supp. 1344, 1354 n.33 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
28 The Parratt doctrine of postdeprivation remedies refers to the second aspect of the Court's
holding: In the event of a negligent deprivation of property, an adequate postdeprivation remedy
can satisfy procedural due process requirements. 451 U.S. at 543-44.
29 See, e.g., Moore, Parratt, Liberty and the Devolution of Due Process: A Time for Reflection, 13 WAYNE
ST. U.L. REv. 201 (1985); Note, Parratt v. Taylor: Limitations on the Parratt Analysis in Section 1983
Actions, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1388, 1402-05 (1984).
30 See supra note 27. In Parratt, Taylor's postdeprivation remedy was a state tort claims proce-
dure. This procedure could have compensated Taylor for the loss he suffered because of the negli-
gence of the state officials. 451 U.S. at 538-44. See also Mann v. City of Tucson, 782 F.2d 790 (9th
Cir. 1986) (refusing to extend the postdeprivation remedies doctrine to claims for violations of sub-
stantive due process).
31 455 U.S. 422 (1982).
32 Id. at 435-36.
33 104 S. Ct. 3194 (1984).
34 104 S. Ct. at 3203.
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lation remediable under section 1983.35
II. Daniels and Davidson
The opinions of the appellate courts in Daniels v. Williams36 and Da-
vidson v. O'Lone37 illustrate several of the justifications that courts have
used to expand, limit, and explain Justice Rehnquist's deceptively simple
statement in Parratt that "the alleged loss, even though negligently
caused, amounted to a deprivation.
' '38
A. Daniels v. Williams
Roy Daniels, an inmate at the Richmond City Jail in Virginia,
brought a section 1983 claim against Deputy Sheriff Andrew Williams.
Daniels alleged that the deputy sheriff deprived him of his fourteenth
amendment liberty interest in freedom from bodily harm. Daniels had
slipped and fallen on a pillow and newspapers that the deputy sheriff had
negligently left on a prison stairway.
39
The district court in Daniels granted the sheriff's motion for sum-
mary judgment. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the summary
judgment dismissal, holding that Parratt applied to the negligent depriva-
tion of a liberty interest (freedom from bodily injury). 40 In extending the
Parratt analysis to the deprivation of a nonproperty interest, the court
held that bodily injury caused by a state official's negligence was a depri-
vation within the meaning of, and thus protected by, the fourteenth
amendment. However, the court found that the Virginia Tort Claims
Act4 ' provided the inmate with an adequate postdeprivation remedy.
42
The Fourth Circuit reconsidered Daniels' petition en banc, and
again denied the inmate's claim, but for very different reasons. On re-
consideration the court rejected the prior decision's extension of Parratt
to the negligent deprivation of nonproperty interests. 43 The court, how-
ever, did not note the important distinction between the two rationales.
In the first case, the court found that an adequate postdeprivation rem-
edy, such as Virginia's tort claims procedure, may satisfy due process
where the state's negligence deprives an individual of a nonproperty in-
terest. In contrast, the en banc court found that where the negligence of
a state official results in bodily injury, the victim is not deprived of an
interest which demands due process.
Thus, the court asserted that negligence can "deprive" an individual
35 See infra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
36 720 F.2d 792 (4th Cir. 1983), aff'd en banc, 748 F.2d 229 (4th Cir. 1984).
37 752 F.2d 817 (3d Cir. 1984) (en banc).
38 451 U.S. at 536-37.
39 Daniels, 720 F.2d at 794.
40 Id. at 795.
41 VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-195.1 - 8.01-195.8 (Supp. 1982).
42 720 F.2d at 795-97. The court found that the possibility that the sheriff might assert a sover-
eign immunity defense was not a denial of due process, because the Parratt holding does not require
that every plaintiff be compensated for the deprivation he has suffered. According to the circuit
court, due process does not guarantee a remedy; opportunity for a hearing "appropriate to the
nature of [the] claim" will satisfy procedural due process requirements. Id. at 798.
43 748 F.2d at 231.
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(and trigger fourteenth amendment protections) of property, but not lib-
erty. The court read Parratt strictly, finding that negligence can result in
the deprivation of one fourteenth amendment interest (property), but
not others (life and liberty). This holding corresponds with Justice
Blackmun's concurrence in Parratt. Blackmun had asserted in Parratt that
the holding should be restricted to its facts, and apply only in those in-
stances where the plaintiff suffered a negligent deprivation of property.44
Ironically, the result of the en banc decision in Daniels affords an
inmate's property more protection than it does his person.45 The court's
holding implies that negligence triggers fourteenth amendment protec-
tions for deprivations of property, but that because an individual cannot
be "deprived" of these constitutionally protected interests by a negligent
act, negligence does not trigger protections for loss of life or liberty.
The Daniels court, justifying this distinction, stated:
The demands of prison safety, life, and discipline make it obligatory
for prison officials to have possession of, and search at some time or
another, all of the property belonging to every prisoner .... Because
the state of necessity has such complete control of the prisoner's prop-
erty, calling it to account for the unexplained loss thereof is not incon-
sistent with demands of the Fourteenth Amendment. No such reasons
exist, however, to set the prisoner above the ordinary citizen in the
protection of his person.46
The Fourth Circuit also based its dismissal of Daniels' claim on a
second, alternative ground. The court found that even if the deputy
sheriff's negligence had deprived Daniels of a liberty interest protected
by the fourteenth amendment, the inmate had a remedy under Virginia
law which satisfied due process requirements. The court held that the
defendant exercised no discretionary duty when he negligently left the
pillow on the stairway. Therefore, he would have been unable to invoke
sovereign immunity as a defense to a suit for negligence in the perform-
ance of ministerial duties.47 Thus, the court did consider whether an im-
munity defense would have denied Daniels due process and afforded him
a valid claim under section 1983.48
44 451 U.S. at 545 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("While I join the Court's opinion in this case, I
write separately to emphasize my understanding of its narrow reach. This suit concerns the depriva-
tion only of property .... I do not read the Court's opinion as applicable to a case concerning
deprivation of life or of liberty.").
45 This distinction is "highly questionable," asserted one commentator, given that "the state
also has complete control over a prisoner's person for security reasons." Moore, supra note 29, at
236. By granting property more protection than life or liberty, the Fourth Circuit violated "the
fundamental truth that life and liberty are far more precious than property." Id. at 236-37. The
dissent in Daniels argues along these same lines. See 748 F.2d at 235 (Phillips, J., dissenting).
46 748 F.2d at 231.
47 Id. at 232.
48 Judge Phillips, in his dissent, disagreed with the majority's assertion that Parratt did not apply
to the negligent deprivation of liberty interests. While admitting that Parratt dealt specifically with
the negligent deprivation of property, Judge Phillips argued that the "critical principles that
emerged from Parratt" should not be so "narrowly confined." id. at 234 (Phillips,J., dissenting). He
asserted that a negligent act can deprive a person of a protected liberty interest, just as a negligent
act can deprive an individual of a protected property interest. Id. at 234-35. For a discussion of
those courts that have extended Parratt to liberty interests, see Moore, supra note 29.
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B. Davidson v. O'Lone
Plaintiff Robert Davidson, like Daniels, was an inmate in a state
prison. He intervened in a fight between two other inmates and, after a
disciplinary hearing, McMillian, one of the inmates, threatened David-
son. Davidson wrote a note to the hearing officer, exonerating himself in
the event that McMillian acted on his threat.49 Prison officials either for-
got or disregarded this note as it was passed up the official hierarchy. 50
Two days later, McMillian attacked Davidson with a fork.5 1 Davidson
sustained a broken nose and stab wounds on his face, head, neck, and
body.5
2
Because the New Jersey Tort Claims Act 55 precluded Davidson from
bringing a claim against the individual defendants or the state in state
court, Davidson brought suit in federal district court under 42 U.S.C.
section 1983. He named Prison Superintendent Edward O'Lone, Assis-
tant Superintendent Cannon, Corrections Sergeant James, and Arthur
Jones, the civilian hearing officer, as defendants in the action. The dis-
trict court granted summary judgment in favor of defendant Superinten-
dent O'Lone. The court found no violation of the eighth amendment
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment because the plaintiff
did not establish the requisite intent-the defendants had not acted with
"deliberate or callous indifference. ' '54 However, the court concluded
that the negligence of Cannon and James had deprived Davidson of his
"constitutionally protected liberty interest in freedom from assault while
in prison." 55 Because the New Jersey immunity provision had denied
Davidson a hearing (and thus denied him of liberty without due process),
the district court awarded Davidson $2000 compensatory damages.
56
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the decision of
the district court and ordered a judgment for the defendants. Judge
Sloviter, writing for the majority, agreed that the prison officials were
negligent in failing to protect Davidson,57 and that Davidson did have a
constitutionally protected liberty interest in freedom from attack.
58
49 The note read:
When I went back to the unit after seeing you McMillian was on the steps outside the
unit. When I was going past him he told me "I'll f- you up you old mother-f- fag." Go up
to your cell, I be right there.
I ignored this and went to another person's cell and thought about it. Then I figured I
should tell you so "if" anything develops you would be aware.
I'm quite content to let this matter drop but evidently McMillian isn't.
Thank you, R. Davidson.
752 F.2d at 819.
50 Jones, the hearing officer, forwarded the note to Cannon, the assistant superintendent of the
prison. Cannon did not consider the situation urgent and forwarded the note to SergeantJames, the
corrections officer. James attended to other matters and forgot about the note. Id.
51 NeitherJames nor Cannon was on duty the day before or the day of the attack. They failed to
notify those officials on duty. Id.
52 Id.
53 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:5-2(b)(4) (West 1982).
54 752 F.2d at 820.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 821.
58 Id. at 822.
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Judge Sloviter found, however, that Davidson was not "deprived" of this
interest. According to Judge Sloviter, Parratt did not hold that "merely
negligent conduct by state officers constitutes a constitutionaldeprivation
encompassed by § 1983." 59
Judge Sloviter acknowledged that under Parratt, section 1983 was
not limited to intentional deprivations. However, she asserted that this
"proposition is not the obverse of one stating that § 1983 encompasses
suits for negligence by state officials, because there is a broad range of
action between the two poles."
60
As Judge Gibbons pointed out in his dissent, Judge Sloviter ignored
some very explicit language in Parratt in order to reach this interpreta-
tion.61 Justice Rehnquist clearly stated in Parratt that the loss of prop-
erty, "even though negligently caused, amounted to a deprivation.
' 62
C. The Supreme Court rationale in Daniels and Davidson
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Daniels and Davidson be-
cause it recognized that the lower federal courts had adopted inconsis-
tent approaches in determining when tortious conduct "rises to the level
of a constitutional tort."63 Despite its efforts in Procunier v. Navarette,64
Baker v. McCollan,65 and Parratt v. Taylor,66 the Court acknowledged that
it had provided an "apparent lack of adequate guidance" on this issue.
67
The Court thus accepted some responsibility for the confusion in the
circuits.
In Daniels and Davidson, the Court attempted, yet again, to identify
the type of state action that would constitute a violation of the due pro-
cess clause of the fourteenth amendment and afford an individual the
right to sue under section 1983. In affirming the circuit court opinion in
Daniels, Justice Rehnquist concluded "that the Due Process Clause is sim-
ply not implicated by a negligent act of an official causing unintended loss
of injury to life, liberty or property."' 68 Thus, the Court overruled Parratt
v. Taylor to the extent that it held to the contrary.69
The Court approached Daniels in a straightforward manner. Rather
59 Id. at 826.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 846 (Gibbons,J., dissenting). For criticism ofJudge Sloviter's opinion, see Moore, supra
note 29, at 229-32; Comment, Civil Rights-Under Section 1983 Prison Officials are not Liable to Prisonerfor
Injuries Inflicted as a Result of Officials' Negligence, 30 VILL. L. REv. 958, 976-79 (1985).
62 451 U.S. at 536-37.
63 Daniels, 106 S. Ct. at 664.
64 434 U.S. 555 (1978). See also supra notes 14-19 and accompanying text.
65 443 U.S. 137 (1979). See also supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
66 451 U.S. 527 (1981). See also supra notes 12-35 and accompanying text.
67 Daniels, 106 S. Ct. at 664. The Court rejected an earlier opportunity to consider this same
issue in Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984).
Justice White, dissenting from the denial of certiorari, stated that the inconsistent results in the
lower federal courts were "attributable, at least in part, to the lack of definitive guidelines for deter-
mining when tortious conduct by state officials rises to the level of a constitutional tort. This Court
should attempt to resolve this 'perplexing' issue, and this case provides us with an opportunity to do
so." 465 U.S. at 1049-50 (White, J., dissenting).
68 106 S. Ct. at 663 (emphasis in the original).
69 In writing for the Court in Daniels and Davidson,Justice Rehnquist overruled the majority deci-
sion he wrote for Parratt less than five years earlier.
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than limiting Parratt's application to property interests (Daniels alleged
deprivations of liberty), or distinguishing Parratt from the instant case, the
Court simply abandoned the notion that the "lack of due care by a state
official could 'deprive' an individual of life, liberty or property under the
Fourteenth Amendment." 70 This apparent abandonment of Parratt is
not a complete turnabout. Justice Rehnquist drew on Justice Powell's
andJustice Stewart's concurring opinions in Parratt to support the Daniels
ruling. Quoting Powell, Justice Rehnquist stated that mere negligence
should not amount to "a deprivation in the constitutional sense."' 7 1 Rehn-
quist then added that the due process clause should only be invoked
when an affirmative abuse of power occurs.
72
Justice Rehnquist's approach in Daniels makes his own holding in
Parratt seem an historical anomoly:
No decision of this Court before Parratt supported the view that negli-
gent conduct by a state official, even though causing injury, constitutes
a deprivation under the Due Process Clause. This history reflects the
traditional and common-sense notion that the Due Process Clause, like
its forebear in the Magna Carta . . . was "intended to secure the indi-
vidual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government."
73
Rehnquist noted that the Court has historically applied the guarantee of
due process to cases where government officials made deliberate deci-
sions to deprive individuals of protected interests. He felt that leaving a
pillow on prison stairs and misplacing an inmate's property were actions
remote from the concerns of governmental oppression and abuse of
power against which the fourteenth amendment protects. 74 Rehnquist
concluded that judicial and legislative history supported his assertion
that no procedure for compensation is constitutionally required where
the state official's act is no more than negligent.
75
Justice Rehnquist dealt briefly with Daniels' arguments. First, he
found unpersuasive Daniels' assertion that some negligence claims fall
within the reach of section 1983.76 Second, Rehnquist rejected Daniels'
contention that litigants could avoid the holding simply by pleading a
state official's actions were intentional rather than negligent. Despite the
"elusive" meaning of the various degrees of intent, Rehnquist asserted
that the difference between negligent and intentional conduct is "abun-
70 106 S. Ct. at 665.
71 Id. at 664 (citing Paratt, 451 U.S. at 547 (PowellJ., concurring in the result)) (emphasis in the
original).
72 Id. at 665.
73 Id. (citations omitted).
74 Id. Paraphrasing Stewart's concurrence in Parralt, Rehnquist stated:
Far from an abuse of power, lack of due care suggests no more than a failure to measure up
to the conduct of a reasonable person. To hold that injury caused by such conduct is a
deprivation within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment would trivialize the centu-
ries-old principle of due process of law.
Id. See Parratt, 451 U.S. at 545-46 (Stewart, J., concurring).
75 Id. at 666 (citing Panratt, 451 U.S. at 548 (Powell, J., concurring in the result)).
76 Even if negligence could support a constitutional claim in some cases, Rehnquist asserted that




Finally, Rehnquist rejected the idea that common law duties (in this
case, the special duty of care owed by a sheriff to those in his custody)
"were constitutionalized by the Fourteenth Amendment."78 He asserted
that a negligent tort does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation
merely because the defendant is a government official.
79
In Davidson, Justice Rehnquist, again writing for the majority, simply
reiterated the holding of Daniels.80 Because Davidson alleged only that
respondents negligently failed to protect him from another inmate,
Rehnquist found no deprivation within the meaning of the fourteenth
amendment. "Daniels therefore controls," he asserted, affirming the re-
sult of the Third Circuit.8 1
Rehnquist conceded that the negligence had led to serious injury,
but maintained that "lack of due care simply does not approach the sort
of abusive government conduct that the Due Process Clause was
designed to prevent."8 2 He stated that due process does not guarantee
due care.8 3 Applying this analysis, he reasoned that no deprivation oc-
curred because respondents' actions were merely negligent.8 4 Accord-
ingly, Rehnquist summarily dismissed petitioner's demand that New
Jersey provide him with a remedy in state court.
Justice Stevens filed a separate concurring opinion which discussed
both Daniels and Davidson.8 5 He objected to the majority's redefinition of
"deprivation," and disagreed that Parratt had to be overruled to support
the holdings. Stevens argued that the bodily injury in each case was a
deprivation of liberty. "Deprivation" describes the "victim's infringe-
ment or loss," not the actor's state of mind. Thus, Stevens asserted that
any action-negligent or intentional-could deprive a petitioner of a
protected constitutional right.8 6
Justice Stevens felt that both petitioners had shown deprivation of
their constitutionally protected rights, and had thus satisfied the first ele-
ment of a procedural due process claim.8 7 Petitioners failed, however, to
establish the second element: that the state procedure which allegedly
denied them due process was constitutionally defective. 88 According to
Stevens, Daniels failed to show that the applicable Virginia tort claims
procedure was constitutionally inadequate. Thus, under Stevens' analy-
77 Rehnquist stated further that "[i]n any event, we decline to trivialize the Due Process Clause
in an effort to simplify constitutional litigation" by eliminating the nice distinctions between varying
degrees of intent. Id. at 667.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 666 (citing Baker, 443 U.S. at 146).
80 "Where a government official is merely negligent in causing an injury, no procedure for com-
pensation is constitutionally required." 106 S. Ct. at 670.
81 Id.
82 Id. (citing Daniels, 106 S. Ct. at 665-66).
83 106 S. Ct. at 670.
84 Id. at 670-71.
85 106 S. Ct. at 677 (Stevens, J., concurring).
86 Id. at 680.
87 Stevens distinguished procedural due process claims from substantive due process claims and
claims that allege violations of specific constitutional guarantees. Id. at 677-79.
88 Id. at 680.
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sis, "a straightforward application of Parratt [that there is no denial of
due process where the state provides an adequate postdeprivation rem-
edy] defeat[ed] Daniels' claim." 89
Stevens felt the Davidson case presented a novel question: whether
"a state policy of noncompensability for certain types of harm, in which
state action may play a role, renders a state procedure constitutionally
defective." 90 Stevens thus addressed a question which the majority, by
holding that no deprivation occurred, did not reach.9'
The result in Daniels generated no dissent, but Justices Brennan,
Blackmun, and Marshall disagreed with the holding in Davidson.92 Justice
Blackmun (joined by Marshall) agreed with the result in Daniels, but re-
fused to extend the principles stated there to Davidson.93 Like the other
Justices, Blackmun began his analysis by asking two questions: (1) was
there a deprivation within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment;
and, if so, (2) what procedures constitute due process?94 He agreed that
mere negligence does not ordinarily constitute an abuse of state power
and work a constitutional deprivation. He objected, however, to the "in-
flexible constitutional dogma" of a rule which held that "negligent activ-
ity can never implicate the concerns of the Due Process Clause." 95
Blackmun insisted that in some cases, "governmental negligence is an
abuse of power." 96 He distinguished the Daniels case, where the negli-
gently placed pillow did not amount to such an abuse:
In Daniels, the negligence was only coincidentally connected to an in-
mate-guard relationship; the same incident could have occurred on
any staircase .... The State did not prohibit him from looking where
he was going or from taking care to avoid the pillow.
In contrast, where the State renders a person vulnerable and
strips him of his ability to defend himself, an injury that results from a
state official's negligence inp erforming his duty is peculiarly related to
the governmental function.9
7
In Blackmun's view, the negligent failure to protect Davidson was an
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 By revising Parratt and holding that negligence will not result in a deprivation, and thus, not
require compensation, the majority neatly sidestepped the constitutional issue Stevens defined. Per-
haps the Court was unwilling to rule on the constitutionality of the state procedures challenged in
Daniels and Davidson. Clearly, the Court will not be able to avoid this issue when a plaintiff challenges
a state procedure of noncompensability for injury which does amount to a "deprivation."
92 Justice Brennan agreed that merely negligent conduct does not constitute a deprivation of
liberty within the meaning of the due process clause. He felt, however, that the prison officials'
failure to protect Davidson from attack rose above the level of simple negligence displayed by the
deputy who left a pillow on a stairway. Brennan asserted that "official conduct which causes per-
sonal injury due to recklessness or deliberate indifference, does deprive the victim of liberty within
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment." Davidson, 106 S. Ct. at 671 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Accordingly, he would have remanded Davidson to the Court of Appeals for a review of the District
Court's holding that the respondents had been merely negligent. Id.
93 Id. at 671 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
94 Id. at 673 (citing Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672 (1977)).
95 Id. (emphasis in the original).
96 Id.
97 Id. at 674.
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abuse of power, and deprived the inmate of his constitutionally protected
liberty interest.
Even if he had agreed that negligence could never work a depriva-
tion within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment, Blackmun would
have remanded Davidson for review. Like Brennan, Blackmun felt that
recklessness would support a claim for a constitutional deprivation. He
believed that the officials' actions in disregarding Davidson's note could
easily be considered reckless.
98
Having established that Davidson suffered a deprivation, Blackmun
was convinced the deprivation occurred without due process of law. As-
suming that Parratt controlled in the event of a deprivation of a nonprop-
erty interest, and that a state could therefore satisfy procedural due
process with a meaningful postdeprivation remedy, New Jersey's immu-
nity statute would nevertheless have barred any state court action.99
While agreeing that a state has the right to define defenses to state law
causes of action, Blackmun felt that a state defense should not control in
a section 1983 action. To permit a state immunity defense to control in a
section 1983 action "would transmute a basic guarantee into an illusory
promise."' 100 Blackmun would have reversed the decision of the court of
appeals, and would have reinstated the district court's award of $2000.101
The differences of opinion as expressed by the dissents to Davidson
are easily attributed to the facts of each case. The facts of Daniels v. Wil-
hams lent themselves to the result the Supreme Court wished to reach. A
misplaced pillow and a relatively minor fall do not raise the spectre of
governmental oppression or "rise to the dignified level of a constitu-
tional violation."' 1 2 To uphold Daniels' claim would justify the Supreme
Court's earlier warning against allowing the fourteenth amendment to
become a "font of tort law to be superimposed on whatever systems may
already be administered by the states."'103
98 Id. at 675.
99 NJ. STAT. ANN. § 59:5-2(b)(4). See also supra note 53.
100 106 S. Ct. at 676 (quoting Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 284 n.8 (1980) (quoting
Hampton v. Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 607 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917 (1974))).
101 Id. at 677. See also Blackmun, Section 1983 and Federal Protection of Individual Rights-Will the
Statute Remain Alive or Fade Away?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REy. 1 (1985). Blackmun's opinion is consistent with
concerns he expressed in this article. Blackmun traced the history of § 1983 and identified the stat-
ute as a "source of controversy." He felt that pressure for restrictions on the scope of the statute
came from sources alleging that § 1983 claims were overburdening the federal courts and emphasiz-
ing the "tension between section 1983 and traditional values of American federalism." Id. at 2.
Blackmun was skeptical of further attempts to limit the scope of the statute, asserting that the
Supreme Court gave "ample evidence of being able to devise protective measures for itself and
other federal courts" with the decisions in Parrait, Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984), and
Pennhurst St. School and Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984). Id. at 21, 28.
102 Davidson, 106 S. Ct. at 671 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
103 Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976) (quoted in Parratt, 451 U.S. at 544, and Daniels, 106 S.
Ct. at 666). Indeed, one commentator termed the facts of Daniels "almost as insipid as those in
Parratt." Moore, supra note 29, at 235 n.279. Had the Supreme Court granted certiorari and agreed
to hearJackson v. City ofJoliet, supra note 1, overruling Parratt would have been more difficult. In
Jackson, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that an attempt by a police officer and
firemen to assist at an accident, where the attempt failed due to negligence, did not deny the dece-
dents of life without due process. Plaintiffs alleged that decedents died because the police officer,
coming upon the scene of the accident, directed traffic away from the burning car rather than at-
tempting to ascertain whether anyone was in the vehicle. The complaint alleged that the occupants
of the car, a young man and a pregnant woman, would not have died if the police officer had not
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In Davidson, however, the plaintiff was seriously injured as a result of
an attack by another-an event the victim had brought to the attention of
the prison officials. 10 4 Thus, Justice Blackmun's separate analysis of Da-
vidson' 0 5 is more faithful to the facts of the case than is Justice Rehn-
quist's summary extension of the Daniels holding to cover the Davidson
facts. Why, then, was Rehnquist, writing for the majority, so quick to
extend Daniels to a very different factual setting?
III. The Lesson of Parratt: Acknowledged, but Unlearned
By declaring Daniels controlling in Davidson, a case which involved
relatively serious bodily injury, the Court showed that it intended its
holding to apply to a broad spectrum of fact situations. The Court em-
phasized that mere negligence can no longer support a section 1983
claim for deprivation of a constitutionally protected interest, regardless
of the extent of the injury or loss caused by the negligence.
10 6
Thus, the Court acknowledged the necessity of making explicit deci-
sions in this "perplexing"'' 0 7 area of law. Without this guidance, lower
federal courts expand and limit the Court's holdings far beyond their
intended scope. The confusion generated by Parratt certainly illustrates
this tendency.'0 8
The Daniels and Davidson opinions provide some guidelines sug-
gesting the intended scope of the decisions. Justice Rehnquist's judg-
ment in Daniels is brief, but explicit. He dearly states that the negligence
of a state official does not implicate the due process clause when the act
causes unintended loss of life, liberty or property. Thus, the holding explic-
itly applies to these interests, which are protected by the fourteenth
amendment. 0 9 The Parratt majority opinion, keeping to the facts of the
case, discussed only property interests. Some lower federal courts re-
sponded by applying Parratt to nonproperty interests, supporting their
conclusions by drawing on the rationales of the separate opinions." 0
In Daniels, Rehnquist indicated precisely what the decision did, and
did not, hold. He stated that the decision applies not to any constitu-
tional violation alleged under section 1983, but only to alleged violations
of the due process clause."' Thus, the Court left open the possibility
diverted traffic (and thus potential rescuers) away from the scene, or if the firemen had discovered
the car was occupied before they extinguished the fire. 715 F.2d at 1201-02. Obviously the tragic
loss of life and the deliberate judgments made by the police and fire officers made this a more
difficult case on which to overrule Parratt and hold that negligence does not support a § 1983 claim.
104 See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
105 See supra text accompanying notes 93-101.
106 "Respondents lack of due care in this case led to serious injury, but that lack of due care
simply does not approach the sort of abusive government conduct that the Due Process Clause was
designed to prevent." Davidson, 106 S. Ct. at 670.
107 Jackson, 465 U.S. at 1049 (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
108 See supra notes 19-35 and accompanying text.
109 Daniels, 106 S. Ct. at 663.
110 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
111 "[W]e need not rule out the possibility that there are other constitutional provisions that
would be violated by mere lack of due care in order to hold, as we do, that such [negligent] conduct




that simple negligence may support a claim alleged under section 1983,
if the claimant alleges a constitutional violation other than the denial of
due process (and which does not carry an underlying intent
requirement). 112
The Court also indicated that it has not decided what more than sim-
ple negligence is necessary to implicate due process protections:
Despite his claim about what he might have pleaded, petitioner
concedes that respondent was at most negligent. Accordingly, this
case affords us no occasion to consider whether something less than
intentional conduct, such as recklessness or "gross negligence," is
enough to trigger the protections of the Due Process Clause.
113
Ironically, by explaining what the Court has not decided, Rehnquist ac-
knowledges the Court's failure to delineate a clear standard.
The Court also indicated, in both decisions, that it had not decided
whether a defendant's immunity defense might result in a denial of due
process by precluding a plaintiff from presenting his case in state court.
In Daniels, Justice Rehnquist emphasized that when an official merely acts
negligently, no procedure for compensation is constitutionally required.
Therefore, the Court did not reach the question of whether an immunity
defense would render a state tort remedy unconstitutional."
14
Justice Rehnquist restated this reasoning in Davidson. The defend-
ants' negligence did not cause a deprivation within the meaning of the
fourteenth amendment. Since no deprivation occurred, the negligent ac-
tion did not trigger due process protections or warrant a remedy. Be-
cause the plaintiff's complaint did not warrant a remedy, the fact that
prison officials had absolute immunity under the New Jersey statute (and
thus an absolute defense to the potential tort claim) was irrelevant.
Under the Court's analysis, the State can not be liable for denying some-
one a process that is not due." 5
It remains for the lower courts to decide the fate of the plaintiff who,
having suffered a loss at the hands of a state official, finds his state tort
claim dismissed because of an immunity defense. Has the loss become a
constitutional violation-a deprivation of a protected interest suffered
without due process of law? Justice Stevens provided some guidance on
this issue in his concurring opinion:
Those aspects of a State's tort regime that defeat recovery are not con-
stitutionally invalid so long as there is no fundamental unfairness in
112 In Parratt, Justice Powell criticized the majority for avoiding the question of whether intent is
an essential element of a due process claim. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 547 nn.2-3 (PowellJ., concurring).
The Court has settled the question with respect to the equal protection clause. See Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229
(1976). The Court has also settled the intent question with respect to the eighth amendment prohi-
bition against cruel and unusual punishment. See U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII; Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97 (1976).
113 Daniels, 106 S. Ct. at 667 n.3. See also Doty v. Carey, 626 F. Supp. 359 (N.D. Ill. 1986). "[The
Court] expressly left open the question of whether an official's grossly negligent conduct would
infringe a substantive right guaranteed by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."
Id. at 361 n.2.
114 106 S. Ct. at 666 n.1 (citing Parratt, 451 U.S. at 548 (Powell, J., concurring in the result)).
115 Davidson, 106 S. Ct. at 670-71.
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their operation.... [T]he mere fact that a State elects to provide some
of its agents with a sovereign immunity defense in certain cases does
not justify the conclusion that its remedial system is constitutionally
inadequate. 116
IV. The Questions Remain
The Supreme Court hoped to eliminate some of the confusion sur-
rounding Parratt by partially overruling the decision." 7 Unfortunately,
the new holding may only create different problems for the lower courts.
If a state official's simple or ordinary negligence does not deprive an in-
dividual of a constitutionally protected interest, it is unclear precisely
what level of state action is required to trigger fourteenth amendment
protections.' 18 Courts which view Daniels and Davidson as unfairly elimi-
nating valid section 1983 claims may draw upon the reasoning of the
Blackmun and Brennan dissents.1 9 Where the facts indicate gross negli-
gence or recklessness, the courts can find a constitutional deprivation
and still pay lip service to the majority holding that no liability exists
under section 1983 where the plaintiff alleges only simple negligence.
The Daniels majority adhered to one basic principle announced in
Parratt-that section 1983 "contains no state of mind requirement in-
dependent of that necessary to state a violation of the underlying consti-
tutional right."' 120 Thus, while merely negligent conduct may not
support a claim under section 1983, presumably something more than
simple negligence may be sufficient.'
2 '
Even after Daniels and Davidson, much of the Parratt decision has
been left intact. The Court still abides by its holding that an adequate
postdeprivation remedy will satisfy the fourteenth amendment guarantee
of due process. 22 While Parratt survives, so do the questions. It is still
116 106 S. Ct. at 680-81 & 681 n.20.
117 Several courts, perhaps relieved to have some guidance in this area, have cited Daniels and
Davidson to support assertions that there can be no liability under § 1983 where the plaintiff has
alleged no more than simple or ordinary negligence. See McClary v. O'Hare, 786 F.2d 83, 85 (2d
Cir. 1986) (Because plaintiff's complaint alleged defendant's conduct was at least reckless, the court
refused to dismiss the complaint on the basis of Daniels and Davidson); McKenna v. City of Memphis,
785 F.2d 560, 562 (6th Cir. 1986); Love v. King, 784 F.2d 708, 713 (5th Cir. 1986); McIntyre v.
Portee, 784 F.2d 566, 567 (4th Cir. 1986); Williams v. City of Boston, 784 F.2d 430, 433 (1st Cir.
1986); King v. Massarweh, 782 F.2d 825, 827 (9th Cir. 1986); Lewis v. O'Leary, 631 F. Supp. 60, 62
(N.D. Ill. 1986); Mazzilli v. Doud, 485 So. 2d 477, 480 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
118 See Janan v. Trammell, 785 F.2d 557 (6th Cir. 1986). "This action may well be one intended
to be controlled by Daniels." Id. at 559. However, because the court was able to review the case and
dismiss it on other grounds, they "decline[d] to deal with the amorphous issues of where on the
spectrum this case falls and whether that amount of negligence is sufficiently close to the 'mere
negligence' end of the spectrum so as to be precluded by Daniels." Id.
119 See supra notes 92-101 and accompanying text.
120 Daniels, 106 S. Ct. at 664 (citing Parratt, 451 U.S. at 534-35).
121 But see Whitney v. Albers, 106 S. Ct. 1078 (1986). In Whitney, the Supreme Court held that the
due process clause affords a prison inmate no greater protection than the cruel and unusual punish-
ment clause of the eighth amendment. Id. at 1088. Thus, at least in the prison inmate context, the
Court intimated that the plaintiff must allege at least deliberate indifference on the part of the de-
fendant to establish a cause of action for violation of either the eighth or fourteenth amendments.
See also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
122 The Parratt holding, partially overruled, resembles the decision in Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S.
517 (1984) (a post deprivation remedy may satisfy due process requirements in the event of an
intentional deprivation of property).
(Vol. 62:98
not clear whether the Parratt doctrine of postdeprivation remedies ap-
plies to deprivations of life and liberty interests in the same way that it
applies to deprivations of property interests.1 23
Courts and commentators will react to Daniels and Davidson as they
did to Parratt.124 Some will interpret the decisions as further limiting the
claims brought under section 1983, and thus a dangerous limitation of an
individual's right to sue in federal court.1 25 Others will view the cases as
a return to the intent of section 1983, enacted to guard against govern-
ment oppression and abuse of power, and not to provide a remedy where
negligent conduct results in unintentional loss or injury. 126 The Daniels
and Davidson opinions will not remove section 1983 from the realm of
academic and judicial criticism and controversy. 127 Perhaps Justice
Blackmun's assessment embodies the hopes of those on both sides of the
controversy: "Whatever is the fate of § 1983 in the future, I do hope that
it survives both as a symbol and as a working mechanism for all of us to
protect the constitutional liberties we treasure." 128
Laura A. Yustak
123 In McClary v. O'Hare, 786 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1986), the court noted that the Supreme Court
had not decided whether Parratt applies to life and liberty interests. Id. at 86. The court cited Black-
mun's concurring opinion in Parratt, which limited the Parratt holding to deprivations of property
interests. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 545 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
124 See supra notes 23-29 and accompanying text.
125 See Mann v. City of Tucson, 782 F.2d 790, 799 (9th Cir. 1986) ("Daniels and Davidson restrict
the scope of section 1983 by holding 'that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is
not implicated by the lack of due care of an official causing unintended injury to life, liberty or
property.' ") (citing Davidson, 106 S. Ct. at 670 (Sneed, J., concurring in the result)).
126 See Love v. King, 784 F.2d at 713; Williams v. City of Boston, 784 F.2d at 433-34. Both cases,
in following Daniels and Davidson, emphasized that § 1983 was enacted to guard against government
oppression and abuse of official power.
127 One judge asserted: "In sum, Daniels and Davidson overruled that portion, and only that por-
tion, ofParratl v. Taylor that held that a negligent loss ofproperty by state officials acting under color
of state law was a 'deprivation' of property within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The circumstances under which it is appropriate to refer to post-depriva-
tion state remedies remain the same as before-frustratingly imprecise." Mann, 782 F.2d at 799
(Sneed, J., concurring in the result).
128 See Blackmun, supra note 101, at 29.
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